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1 This prescription is certainly not novel, see Joskow (2000), but contracts have only recently been
accepted by regulators in California and real-time retail pricing still is not a priority in most restruc-
tured markets.
2 Cost-of-service regulation is eﬁectively a cost-plus contract between the regulated, vertically-integra-
ted utility and the customers, where payment is adjusted for virtually all changes in the utility’s cost
of production. Defense contracting has often been conducted in this way.
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3 This potential has been quite apparent in other capital-intensive industries, for instance, the memory
chip market. In the early 1990s, high prices induced massive investment in memory chip fabrication
plants. The resulting excess capacity caused prices of memory chips to collapse and producers to lose
billions of dollars.
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4 See Wolfram (1999), Borenstein & Bushnell (1999), Borenstein (2000), Borenstein, Bushnell & Wolak
(2000), and Joskow & Kahn (2000).
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5 One could think of this as a competitive supply curve if the market is competitive. If ﬂrms have the
ability to exercise market power, one could think of this roughly as a \quantity/price outcome" curve
that also incorporates prices that deviate from marginal cost.
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6 Transmission losses, which can dissipate as much as 10%-20% of the marginal quantity transmitted,
increase the marginal cost of this power even before hitting the capacity constraint. But if a cost
increase of that magnitude were the only barrier to bringing in ample supply, we still would not see
10- or 100-fold price spikes.
7 The same idea applies even to housing markets, where products are diﬁerentiated. The price most
sellers are willing to accept is based on current market conditions, and is unrelated to the owner’s
\cost" as indicated by the price at which she bought the house or the length of time for which she
owned it.
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8 This is an assumption with which many people would take issue.
9 The discussion here refers to long-term contracts that are negotiated in a market context, whether
bilaterally or in a more organized forward market. Cost-based long-term contracts that are imposed
through a regulatory process oﬁer much of the same hedging beneﬂt, but the relationship between
long-term contract and spot prices is not as clear cut.
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10 Statements by various parties that trumpet the savings buyers obtain by purchasing power through
forward markets do not mention the losses of exactly equal size that producers experience by selling
in advance. Generators would not be likely to continue to sell in the forward market if they knew
they could systematically earn more in the spot market.
11 Borenstein, Bushnell, Knittel, and Wolfram (BBKW, 2000) looks at the relationship between the
price in the California Power Exchanges day-ahead price and the California ISO’s balancing market
price. As discussed by BBKW, there could be a systematically lower price in the forward market if
sellers are systematically more risk averse than buyers, but this is unlikely to occur.
12 This insight is generally attributed to Allaz and Vila (1993).
13 The mutual forbearance can take the form of implicit or explicit collusion or it can be ﬂrms simply
competing less aggresively than they could by, for instance, limiting the quantity of power they make
available to the market (called \Cournot competition").
14 Borenstein (2000) discusses this.
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15 Outside the U.S., peak/oﬁ-peak pricing is much more common, though it is virtually always imple-
mented as a two- or three-price system with, for instance, one price for daytime usage and a lower
price for nighttime usage. Real-time retail pricing, in contrast, allows prices to change with each
given time interval, such as 10 minutes or one hour, and prices need not be the same at a given time
from one day to the next.
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16 The spot price here could refer to the PX day-ahead price or the ISO imbalance energy price. Ob-
viously, this entire discussion assumes that the customer has installed a real-time electricity meter.
The cost of such meters is not a signiﬂcant expense for most commercial and industrial customers,
but could be for many residential customers.
17 In fact, the contract just has to have less variance than the spot price. It could, for instance, have a
fuel adjustment clause.
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18 Though it does not occur in this illustration, it is possible that this formula could result in negative
prices in certain hours. This outcome could easily be avoided, however, with a small modiﬂcation. A
minimum price, say 1/ c per kilowatt-hour, could be set and any resulting excess revenue could then
be redistributed evenly among all other hours.
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19 This illustration slightly overstates the monthly bill stability that could be achieved through 80%
hedging because it assumes that the hedged quantity is 80% of the actual demand in each hour. The
contract (or contracts) would quite likely hedge a larger quantity during periods when demand is
anticipated to be high, but the variation would probably not match exactly the actual variation in
consumption that occurs. Since price will be highest in periods when the quantity exceeds anticipated
levels, the protection from the hedging contract would be slightly less than if it matched the actual
consumption pattern exactly.
20 It is also worth noting that setting retail prices below the sum of the wholesale price and the trans-
mission and distribution charge can move prices closer to the actual marginal cost, even if there is
no market power present. Transmission and distribution is charged on a marginal basis, but these
costs are largely ﬂxed. Therefore, reducing price by up to the T&D fee that would otherwise be in
the retail price has the eﬁect of moving price closer to marginal cost.
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21 This is especially likely if, as now seems contemplated in California, the UDC signs long-term con-
tracts at \levelized" rates in order to smooth (or hide) the generators’ collection of proﬂts that they
would otherwise earn mostly in the next year or two. Because the price of natural gas is expected to
decline and new plants will ease the capacity shortage in California, a levelized long-term contract
leaves prices higher than the expected spot price in more distant future years.
22 From an economic point of view, an exit fee does seem to be the best way to deal with this possibility.
The correct exit fee would be the customer’s pro rata share of the expected loss on the remainder of
outstanding long-term contracts. This would result in an economic incentive to leave the incumbent
UDC only if the customer’s new ESP can oﬁer, going forward, to provide power at lower cost or with
higher quality of associated services.
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23 Signing a long-term contract for the fuel, however, can then be an eﬁective hedge. Hydroelectric
power provides a varying and unpredictable degree of hedging year-to-year.
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24 A very similar self-selection problem occurs if real-time pricing is implemented on a voluntary basis.
Those entities that know they consume disproportionately at the peak times will not opt for the
program and will thus continue to have no incentive to conserve when the system is strained. Partic-
ularly for industrial and commercial consumers, real-time pricing is best implemented as the default
pricing system. If a company then wanted to sign a contract with a power marketer to obtain ￿at
prices, they could do so. Marketers, however, would sell such contracts at a very high price, because
they would recognize that the buyers are customers who disproportionately consume at high-cost
times.
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25 For public health reasons, one might want to exempt, or explicitly subsidize, low-income consumers
who are reliant on electricity use at peaks times.
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26 Amortization of the plant ﬂxed costs will not ﬂgure into the calculation, but the need for more
frequent maintenance as the plant operates for more hours will.
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27 See Carlton & Perloﬁ (1994), pp. 864-870, for an example.
28 Consider a region with two markets, A and B, and a large-capacity transmission line between them.
Assume that the competitive market price in this region would be $180, but a group of ﬂrms with
market power are able to push the price up to $300. Assume also that marketers can take advantage
of any proﬂtable arbitrage opportunity between the two markets. Now impose a price cap of $250
in market A. Power then shifts to market B until the price in B is pushed down to $250. No more
power would be sold in B { if it were, it would push the price in B below $250 { until all demand at
$250 is satisﬂed in A. The question then is whether all demand at $250 will be satisﬂed. However,
there is no reason for ﬂrms, even ones with market power, not to fulﬂll all demand at $250 because
they can do so at a marginal cost below $250 (which follows immediately from the fact that the
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competitive price is less than $250) and additional production to fulﬂll demand in A does not drive
down the price they receive for their sales in B, which is already at $250. The only case in which
this will not hold is if market A is so small relative to market B that all ﬂrms are better oﬁ ceasing
sales in market A and maintaining the price above $250 in market B. (If the transmission line is not
of su–cient capacity to handle all attempts to ship power out of the area with the price cap, then
the cap is even less likely to result in shortages in the price cap area.)
29 If, for instance, the dissemination of real-time price information broke down on a hot summer after
(due, say, to an internet failure), the price cap would prevent prices from rising to levels that would
not occur in a functioning market.
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30 I specify other companies here because, notwithstanding the recent order from the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, a utility selling power into an electricity market and buying it back at the
same price is not driving up its costs of providing power. When a utility sells power into the market
and buys back the same amount of power from the same market at the same price, its net cost of that
power is still just its production cost. The FERC’s order that California utilities retain their power
for their own use is not going to signiﬂcantly change their costs of providing power to customers.
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Real-time Pricing with Monthly Bill Stability
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PX Month Avg  (18.08 cents)
100% Contract  (10 cents)
20% PX Month Avg + 80%
Contract   (11.62  cents)               
PX Adjusted for Contract          
(PX-6.46 cents)
 